Swarthmore College

Works
Philosophy Faculty Works

Philosophy

Winter 2015

Review Of "Wittgenstein And Natural Religion" By G. Graham
Richard Thomas Eldridge
Swarthmore College, reldrid1@swarthmore.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Let us know how access to these works benefits you

Recommended Citation
Richard Thomas Eldridge. (2015). "Review Of "Wittgenstein And Natural Religion" By G. Graham". Journal
Of Mind And Behavior. Volume 36, Issue 1-2. 113-119.
https://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/310

This work is brought to you for free by Swarthmore College Libraries' Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Philosophy Faculty Works by an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact
myworks@swarthmore.edu.

113

©2015 The Institute of Mind and Behavior, Inc.
The Journal of Mind and Behavior
Winter and Spring 2015, Volume 36, Numbers 1 and 2
Pages 113–120
ISSN 0271–0137

Wittgenstein and Natural Religion. Gordon Graham. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2014, 219 pages, $55.00 hardcover.

Reviewed by Richard Eldridge, Swarthmore College
Once upon a time, a number of philosophers both influenced by Wittgenstein and interested in religion argued that ontological commitments are at best secondary within religious
life. What is instead of primary importance is whether there is anything meaningful in
religious practice, that is, in what religious people say and do. As D. Z. Phillips put it,
To ask whether God exists is not to ask a theoretical question. If it is to mean anything at all, it is to
wonder about praising and praying; it is to wonder whether there is anything in all that. . . . “There is a
God”, though it appears to be in the indicative mood, is an expression of faith. (1976, p. 181)

This stance has the virtue of not condescending to ordinary pious worshippers from a
position of assumed intellectual authority (often scientific) with respect to ontological
questions that are taken — or mistaken, Phillips argues — by the opponents of religion
to be both addressable apart from practices of worship and crucial to religious life. Sadly,
that kind of condescension is found, for example, in Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion
(2006) and Christopher Hitchens’ God is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything (2009).
Both these writers focus primarily on reference and existence, and they (mis)take materialism for granted as a metaphysical stance that is mandated by modern science. Neither
makes a serious effort to imagine what non-idolatrous religious people might mean by
what they say and do. Happily, Phillips and other religious thinkers influenced by Wittgenstein have avoided this condescension.
Phillips’ view also resonates with broad Wittgensteinian ideas about the meanings of
words as functions of their uses, not only of their senses and referents thought to exist
apart from their uses. But it is otherwise not a fully happy stance. Just how is one to go
about figuring out whether there is anything at all in praising and praying? Are the words
of religious believers as they are used in their prayers and praises simply to be accepted
as meaningful without any inquiries into reference? Is it reasonable to regard belief as
wholly secondary within religious life and as insulated by its involvement in religious
practices from external criticisms? To think of belief in this way at least verges on a form
of religious quietism that is complacent in its rituals in virtue of being detached from
the sorts of critical reflections about beliefs that are normal both within other practices
Thanks to Sarah Vandegrift Eldridge, Hannah Vandegrift Eldridge, and Hugh Lacey for very
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Correspondence concerning this article should be
addressed to Richard Eldridge, Ph.D., Philosophy Department, Swarthmore College, 500 College
Avenue, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081. Email: reldrid1@swarthmore.edu
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and where divergent practices and their ontological commitments bump up against one
another. By this standard, astrology might pass muster as a meaningful enterprise as long
as its practitioners are sufficiently sincere and consistent.
In his new book, Wittgenstein and Natural Religion, Gordon Graham undertakes to avoid
this kind of religious quietism and to do so by developing a more complex and accurate
picture of Wittgenstein’s views about meaning and their relevance to questions about
religious life. According to this richer reading of Wittgenstein, practices and uses matter:
Platonist and Fregean conceptions of abstract entities as eternal senses of expressions are
rejected, and meanings are instead understood as established by commitments in practice to criteria for the uses of words. These semantic commitments are, however, neither
isolated nor self-standing. Instead they are complexly bound up with significant ranges of
epistemic and practical commitments, and critical questions both can be raised and will
naturally arise about whether any given ensemble of commitments is coherent and stably
livable over time. This is a significant theme in Hegel, most prominent in the transition
from Chapter V to Chapter VI of the Phenomenology, where Hegel argues that epistemic
commitments must be understood as figuring essentially within the larger ensembles of
shared practical commitments that form a Sittlichkeit or form of ethical life. Similarly,
Graham argues that we must acknowledge “the interplay between action, emotion, and
belief” [p. 10]1 in forming, living by, and testing any ensemble of commitments. As Hume
saw, there are “distinctive roles within religion as it appears in the lives of human beings”
for each of “the faculties of intellect, emotion and will” [p. 10]. Hence “philosophical
understanding of religion as a human phenomenon” [p. xii] must be neither an abstract,
intellectual theology, nor a form of physical–material science that denies the existence
of will and commitment, nor a non-critical acceptance of all sincerely passionate ritual.
Instead it must investigate “the proper place [ — if any — ] of religion in well-ordered
human lives, on both a personal and a social level” [p. 7]. This will require distinguishing
what Graham calls “true religion” (comparable to “true” or “genuine” friendship) or
healthy religion, on the one hand, from superstition, idolatry, or otherwise unhealthy
religion, on the other, so far as this distinction can be drawn [p. xiii].
But how is this distinction to be drawn? It is, again, not to be taken for granted that
any sincere and passionate practices of worship contribute to healthy and well-ordered
human life. Contra what Kai Nielesen dubbed the “Wittgensteinian fideism” often associated with Phillips, Fergus Kerr, and Peter Winch, among others,
“surface” [or pointlessness] and “depth” [or significant point] cannot be simply read off the things
religious believers say. Religious believers say lots of things, and the judgment that some of these
are ridiculous, blasphemous, or obsolete requires us to relate them to the point of the activity,
and to show how they could be changed or abandoned without loss to what [ — if anything — ]
is essential. [p. 53]

Likewise, then, for establishing that what religious believers say has depth or point: it
must be shown that what they say cannot be changed or abandoned without a loss of
genuine significance in life. And here it will not do to say that what is essential to religious
practice is simply the expression of a religious attitude. Instead, expression, attitude, and
practice must be critically tested to see whether or not they contribute to healthy and
well-ordered human life. (Toward the end of his life, Phillips himself disavowed fideism
and held along the lines Graham favors that a genuinely Wittgensteinian conception
of the relations among practices, beliefs, and meanings does leave room for the rational
criticism of religious practices [Phillips, 2005].)
1

All page references to Graham will be placed in brackets.
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Graham dubs critical inquiry into the point, if any, of religious practices a philosophy of
natural religion, that is, of religion as it lived and practiced in ways that involve complexly
entangled beliefs, emotions, and attitudes. Does any such ensemble of commitments have
a point in contributing to well-ordered human life? To ask this question is in fact to engage
in a kind of critical philosophical anthropology: anthropology insofar as the question is
focused on the complex sayings, doings, feelings, and beliefs of human beings, together with
their objects; philosophical insofar as the question attempts to characterize these sayings,
doings, and so on not simply descriptively or as matters of cultural fact alone, but instead
in relation to broad, general, philosophical conceptions of human well-being, health, and
interest; and critical insofar as the question is prepared to compare and assess the point in
furthering human well-being of a variety of human religious practices, including entertaining the possibility that none of them in the end has a healthy point.
Rightly and importantly, Graham argues that Wittgenstein was both arguing for and
practicing an inquiry of this kind, guided significantly by the thought that distinctively
philosophical–intellectual practices of inquiry may themselves not have a point. Whether
they do is to be assessed by considering to what extent, if any, talk of Platonic forms,
sempiternal objects, fixed frameworks of language, inner states of consciousness, rules
established absolutely apart from human propensities and projections, and all the other
favored objects of the discourses of the philosophers itself makes sense and contributes
to healthy human life. Mostly, it turns out, it does not, and we would be better off to
engage in critical reflective surviews of uses of words, as well as of larger practices and
commitments in relation to human needs and interests, than to try to ground any of
them absolutely by reference to something eternal. (“Surview” is a term introduced by G.
P. Baker and P. M. S. Hacker in their commentaries on Philosophical Investigations roughly
to translate Wittgenstein’s übersichtlichte Darstellung or “perspicuous representation” and
to give a positive characterization of the reflective activity that the text both practices
and urges on us [Baker and Hacker, 1980, p. 531ff].) It is both a considerable advance in
Wittgenstein studies and an important point in the philosophy of religion on Graham’s
part to see Wittgenstein as showing us how to ask similar questions about religious talk
and practice rather than as defending what came to be called Wittgensteinian fideism.
In order, however, actually to carry out the critical philosophical anthropological inquiry with respect to religion, there are a number of dangers that must be avoided. First, the
inquiry must avoid fideism or religious autonomism; that is, it must reject the thought
that religious language and practice are in principle immune to all possible external criticism. Graham both makes the case for avoiding this and successfully avoids it. Second,
while rightly broad church in spirit, the inquiry must not be too ecumenical. That is, it
must reject the thought that all religions are at bottom the same in functioning essentially
as vehicles for the expression of a relatively uncontentful responsiveness to the divine or
sense of the sacred. Arguably, John Hick makes this mistake in his interpretation of religious practices. Hick writes: “Seen in historical context these movements of faith — the
Judaic–Christian, the Buddhist, the Hindu, the Muslim — are not essentially rivals. . . .
The suggestion that we must consider is that these [movements of faith] were all movements of the divine revelation” (1989, p. 136). Since these traditions are in fact at odds
with one another both practically and ontologically, to be this broadly ecumenical is to
take none of them seriously. Hick responds to this worry by arguing that all major religious
traditions involve responsiveness to God conceived of as an ultimate reality or Ding-an-sich
(along Kantian lines) whose nature we cannot know empirically. Hence there may be more
consistency among these traditions than there appears to be at first glance. In order, however,
to uphold the possibility of practical consistency across divergent traditions, Hick is forced
to hold that “the question . . . whether belief, or disbelief, in reincarnation [is] essential for
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salvation/liberation. . . . is not soteriologically vital” (1989, pp. 368–369). Since, however,
in many traditions it is orthodox that salvation does depend on specific kinds of actions
motivated by specific kinds of beliefs, Hick’s view threatens to amount to an ecumenicist
and in fact non-religious defense of the moral life along Kantian lines. Graham effectively
avoids this second danger of excessive ecumenicism by focusing primarily on the question
of the worth of specifically Christian practices and commitments. Third, the inquiry
must also not be too exclusivist and uncritical. Instead it must subject any religion to
genuinely critical investigation in relation to a broad conception of healthy human life to
which it may or may not contribute, pending the results of the investigation. It is less clear
that Graham avoids this third danger.
The risk of falling into exclusivism is due in significant part to the fact that Graham
focuses his critical anthropology only on the ritual of Christian communion. Despite the
passage already cited in which he acknowledges that the inquiry must take up “the proper
place [ — if any — ] of religion in well-ordered human lives, on both a personal and a social
level” [p. 7, emphasis added], Graham pays no significant attention to the daily personal
lives of practitioners of Christianity outside their participation in worship, to the forms
of social life that are distinctive of Christians, or to non-Christian religion. In one way,
Graham’s concentration on the Christian order of worship is salutary: it allows him to
develop a rich account of just what its practitioners might be doing in using its specific
words. But it also has the disadvantage of drawing attention away from the issue of what
a personal and social religious life outside the worship service might look like. No doubt
there are no strict entailments from participation in the Christian order of worship to a
particular way of life, personal or social, just as there are no strict entailments from professions of faith to personal and social daily life in other religions. There are, after all, both
fundamentalists and liberals of many religious stripes. But if the issue is — as Graham
takes it to be and as it should be — the role of religion (if any) in a healthy human life,
then failing to consider and assess overall shapes of religious life, personal and social, is a
large omission. One wants to know more here than Graham provides about whether and
how participation in Christian worship might contribute to justice, decency, tolerance,
and human flourishing in daily life, individual and joint. Traditionally within Christianity, participation in worship (as well as prayer) and working appropriately for justice
(helping to prepare for the kingdom of God) are thought to reinforce each other. Thus
it is at least an important empirical question whether this is true. It is to the credit of
Dawkins and Hitchens that they do take up this issue in detail with respect to a variety of
religions, even if one might wish for less heavy-handedness in their accounts. For example
Hitchens argues that Martin Luther King was a good person whose activism improved
countless human lives, but who also was not a Christian, given that he rejected the idea
of a merciless and vengeful God (Hitchens, 2009, pp. 173–176). Here Hitchens shows less
awareness of and respect for centuries of development of Christian thought and practice
than he ought.
Graham’s effort to fill in the required critical philosophical anthropology (or, in his
terms, a philosophy of natural religion: that is, an account of religion’s point and significance) of specifically Christian religious practices of worship comes in three steps. First
there is the fact that many human beings, perhaps even the majority, possess “a sense of
the sacred” [p. 113]. This is best understood not as a form of sense perception, but rather
as a form of sensibility or a broad “feel” for what is to be done in certain circumstances,
comparable to having a musical ear or a sense of hospitality. Such “a sense of the sacred
can be perverted and distorted in ways that give rise to superstition and idolatry,” Graham
acknowledges, and some people may simply lack it, just as some people lack a musical ear
[p. 113]. Nonetheless, there is, Graham argues, some “reason to regard those who lack [it]
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as people whose lives are seriously impoverished” [p. 113]. Rather, having a sense of the
sacred that is expressed legitimately, non-superstitiously, and non-idolatrously is at least a
significant dimension of human flourishing.
Second, a sense of the sacred can be fitly expressed in worship as a form of ritual.
Drawing on Giambattista Vico and Roger Scruton, Graham suggests that religious rituals
arise as responses to the awe-inspiring presences in human lives of birth, sex, and death
[pp. 180–181]. Participation in worship is “practical, but also purposeless” [p. 162]; that is,
worshippers do things, but do not act instrumentally in order to achieve an end. (While
one might accept Graham’s rejection of intercessory prayer directed at worldly ends, one
might also wonder whether prayer to receive and act according to grace or prayer for the
kingdom of God to come quite fit this characterization.) That is, participants express
their sensibility for the sacred; they “mark or shape time” through activities with plotted beginnings, middles, and ends that enable “acknowledgement of the infinity within
which human finitude is set” [p. 165]. More specifically, the rite of Christian communion
stands to spiritual identities and to the participants in the rite as a theater script stands
to characters and to actors [p. 168]; by participating in the rite, agents take on a spiritual
identity that they would not otherwise have, and they do so corporately, as a united body,
not as merely cooperating individuals. “Christian communion . . . is thus to be seen as a
ritual in which the faithful corporately enact the cosmic drama of the world’s salvation”
[pp. 168–169]. This ritual, however, is not merely expressive. “At its heart lies symbolic
meaning rather than practical purpose or emotional expression,” where the use of symbol
involves “grappl[ing] with the edges of existence” [p. 178].
Third and most crucially, none of this is best understood merely psychologically as a
function only of merely human needs and interests. Graham endorses the arguments of
Alvin Plantinga and John Earman that propose that laws of nature are genuine, necessary, and govern the course of nature only on the condition that they are made by a divine
will. “The will of a Supreme Being is a necessary pre-condition of the law-governed world
disclosed by science” [p. 190]. And likewise for the sense of being governed non-idolatrously by the laws of (Christian) religious ritual. “A sense of the sacred, even if properly
called ‘natural’ to human beings, must be God given and God guided” [p. 190].
Given these three crucial points — that (many) human beings possess a sense of
the sacred; that this sense is (best) expressible non-idolatrously in Christian rituals of
worship, especially in the rite of communion; and that the intelligibility of this ritual
requires that it have been ordained to us by God — Graham’s case is complete. As Graham
puts it, citing Aquinas, the laws of the Christian worship service that specify its ritual acts
(together, as well, with “revelation in Christ . . . and the legal and moral codes that societies
promulgate”) “enable human beings . . . to ‘participate’ in the eternal law of God . . . and
to do so in an ‘intellectual and rational manner,’ in contrast to the way that ‘irrational
animals partake of the eternal reason’” [pp. 194–195]. The rituals of Christian worship
stand as reasonably formed, self-conscious, and centrally apt forms of distinctively human
responsiveness to God’s ordonnance.
How persuasive is this argument? It is not intended as a proof or demonstration from
premises that any reasonable person should accept, but rather as a reading of religious
practices carried out from the point of view of someone passionately interested in what
some of them might mean, that is, someone who is attempting to work through wonder
and puzzlement at religious life in the hope of finding sense in it. Is this effort at working
through wonder and puzzlement compelling?
It is not clear that it is. The third step, drawing on Plantinga and Earman, is distressingly theological, given Graham’s effort to avoid “the distractions of metaphysical
theology” [p. 201]. It involves conceiving of laws of physical nature as necessary and as
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governing events in senses that can and must be explicated by whatever best account we
can construct and specifically by the account according to which God made them. But
why should we accept this account of laws of nature? Perhaps we ought to regard them
as in some sense necessary, but why should we accept the thought that we are able to
explicate the nature of this necessity? Why not say instead, as Newton said about the
metaphysical nature and source of the law of gravitational attraction, “hypotheses non
fingo”? Necessity may attach to this law, but we are not in a position to grasp and explain
its nature. On this conception, laws of nature are descriptive of a necessity whose nature
we cannot grasp; pointedly they are not, or not necessarily, laws that are legislated by a
divine will. With this weaker conception of the nature of laws of nature than that favored
by Plantinga and Earman, the third step collapses, and Graham is unable to establish
that God is the creator of human beings, together with their needs and interests, and
their fittest modes of response to those needs and interests in religious rituals that He
has ordained. And without the undergirding theology provided by this questionable third
step, Graham’s effort to establish the distinctive point and intelligibility of (Christian)
religious worship comes dangerously close to collapsing back into the kind of fideism that
he is rightly concerned to avoid.
Second and more broadly, Graham’s reading of human life arguably establishes persuasively that a sensibility for the infinite and involvement as a member in corporate, not
merely cooperative, activity are things that enrich a human life. Absent the metaphysical
theology, however, what makes the Christian rite of communion an especially central and
apt mode of expressing that sensibility and engaging in corporate activity? For example,
why cannot a passionate sensibility for the infinite be expressed in the corporate activities
of a musical, literary, scientific, or political life? Wonder at shared finite human existence
within a larger infinite order is certainly discernible in some reaches of these activities, as
well as, of course, within quite disparate religious traditions. If these are all ways of expressing this sensibility equally aptly, then the argument lapses into a non-critical ecumenicism;
if they are supposed not to be equally apt, and only the Christian rites are fully exemplary
for this expression, then the metaphysical theology — specifically the theology according
to which God ordained the specific laws of the rite of Christian communion through the
teachings of His only begotten Son — is necessary in order to uphold this supposition and
avoid an arbitrary exclusivism, and it is not clear that that theology can stand.
Finally, one wants, as already noted, to know much more than Graham provides about
connections between participation in Christian worship and healthy individual and
social daily life (familial, moral, political, economic, cognitive, and so on), beyond simply
having a sensibility for the sacred. Graham might hope to evade this issue by arguing that
participation in Christian worship and in other forms of non-idolatrous worship is per se
an enrichment of human life comparable, again, to having a musical ear or sensibility. No
matter whether a given individual life is virtuous or vicious, it will nonetheless be richer if
it includes participation in some non-idolatrous form of worship than an otherwise identical life that does not. This reply, however, loosens the connection between participation
in worship, on the one hand, and the activities of daily life, on the other, that is central
to many religious traditions, including Christianity. In these traditions, participation in
worship is typically taken to provide both understanding and motivation for transformed
action in daily life. Hence two questions remain open: which specific forms of worship
are non-idolatrous, and is a life that includes participation in them in fact made better
overall by that participation? The possibility that participation in worship, even if per se
enriching, might also motivate evil, complacency, arrogance, insensitivity or other forms
of viciousness in daily life must be faced head on and defeated, if the overall value of
religious ritual is to be defended. One might make a similar point about the overall value
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in life of having a musical ear. It takes time, money, work, and contexts of interaction in
order to develop a musical sensibility within a particular musical tradition, and it could
turn out that participation in such a tradition distorts the lives of its members overall.
Prima facie, having a musical life may seem more abstract and innocent than having a
religious life, in that unlike religion it does not urge specific moral, economic, or political
practices on its participants, but there is still an empirical question about the shape and
value of a developed, specific, individual musical life as a species of overall human life.
It is, however, unclear where these objections to Graham’s argument leave the question of
the truth of Christian religion. Graham’s effort to uphold Christianity’s distinctive intelligibility and point is passionate, deeply informed, and argumentative. This effort bears comparison
with the greatest argumentative effort to establish via metaphysico–interpretive means the
distinctive truth of Christianity: Hegel’s — in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. Hence
the thought that the case is nonetheless not settled by metaphysico–interpretive means might
be regarded as Kierkegaardian, where Kierkegaard, and pointedly not Hegel, was a figure of
major importance to Wittgenstein.
If the argument fails, even when taken as a reading of Christian religious practices rather
than as a proof, that does not mean that its conclusion is false. Nor does it mean that
Christian practices of worship are without some important point and value that might
also be realized within other practices. Going further, however, to accept the truth of
Christianity and the distinctive value of its ensemble of beliefs and practices may require
not only argument in a broad, interpretive sense, but also the workings of grace. As Alan
Donagan once observed, “From a contemporary naturalist point of view much of what we
all reasonably believe about ourselves [e.g., that we have freedom of the will, a sensibility
for the infinite, and possibilities of meaningful corporate activity] is unexplained, and
the misery of the condition in which serious inquirers take themselves to be would have
no remedy. In this situation, faith may seem to inquirers possible, and not irrational.
And then, by some means they do not understand but which the church teaches is the
operation of grace, it may become actual” (1999, p. 32). Or it may not: grace, if it exists,
has its mysteries when seen from the standpoint of the intellect. Perhaps this is why Wittgenstein, lacking grace, was not able himself to embrace Judeo–Christian religion. In the
words of Paul: “For Jews demand signs and Greeks desire wisdom, but we proclaim Christ
crucified, a stumbling block to Jews and foolishness to Gentiles, but to those who are
called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God” (Coogan
et al., 2010, p. 1996; 1 Corinthians I: 22–24).
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